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A hose who recognize and appreciate
the regional diversity of our national
economy can readily understand why I
believe that price stability is the only pol-
icy objective that the Federal Reserve
System can achieve. My reason for
espousing this view is quite simple and
is vested in the nature of national busi-
ness cycles.
The national economy is an amalgam
of diverse regional economies. The na-
tional business cycle, likewise, is an
average of regional business cycles,
which differ according to the timing of
peaks and troughs and the magnitudes
of expansions and contractions. Conse-
quently, just as it is impossible for the
Federal Reserve to pursue multiple na-
tional objectives, it becomes clear that
aiming a single monetary instrument at
a national target, which is made up of
separate and perhaps independent
regional cycles, would be a futile exer-
cise that could yield only unpredictable
and mostly undesirable results.
Weak national economic conditions
have once again raised the issue of
whether the Federal Reserve should
take steps to stimulate the economy and
of how large those steps should be. The
System repeatedly reduced the discount
rate and the federal funds rate late last
year and early in 1991 in response to
the economic slowdown. I have some-
times disagreed with the underlying mo-
tive, but I have not been troubled by
these policy actions, because I do not
think that they are inconsistent with
progress toward lower inflation.
Nevertheless, I am troubled by the infer-
ence made by many analysts and policy-
makers that the Federal Reserve, by sim-
ply turning on the money spigots, can
restore the economy to an acceptable and
sustainable long-run growth path.
Therefore, in this Economic Commen-
tary I wish to express why I believe
that price stability is the only objective
the Federal Reserve can achieve, and
why I believe that a monetary policy
that pursues price stability is optimal in
a country whose regional diversity is as
broad as ours.
I have often publicly discussed my rea-
sons for not tying monetary policy ob-
jectives to the business cycle. My posi-
tion stems from what policymakers can
reasonably be expected to know about
the economy and how policy affects the
economy. I furthermore contend that
regional economic diversity strength-
ens these arguments.
• Should the Federal Reserve
Respond to Business Cycles?
It is generally accepted that monetary
policy affects the general price level in
the long run, and aggregate output and
employment in the short run. Therefore,
why not simply pursue different mone-
tary policies at different stages of the
business cycle? Why not pursue a pol-
icy of stimulating output during a reces-
sion and promoting price stability when
the economy has recovered and begins
expanding again? Actually, that was
pretty much what the Federal Reserve
did in the 1970s, and the results were
not good. We achieved neither price sta-
bility nor full employment.
In a recession, it may seem advanta-
geous for the Federal Reserve System
to stimulate output by expanding the
money supply. This response cannot
remedy the structural shocks that
affect regional economies, however. In
a recent speech, Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland President W. Lee
Hoskins presented this analysis of
how regional economic structure sup-
ports the goal of price stability as the
Fed's sole monetary policy focus.
First, we simply don't have the forecast-
ing accuracy to fine-tune the economy
with the precision necessary to imple-
ment a stop-and-go policy of expanding
the money supply more rapidly when
the risk of recession is higher, and re-
stricting the monetary expansion when
the threat subsides but is replaced by a
greater likelihood of inflation. Even in
the dullest of times, the world abounds
with enough random events of signifi-
cant economic consequence to make
accurate forecasts virtually impossible.
And dramatic events like the Persian
Gulf conflict can only play complete
havoc with our best, but still imperfect,
forecasts. Who would have thought last
May that Iraq would invade Kuwait and
that by October oil prices would more
than double, to over $40 a barrel? Obvi-
ously, shocks by definition are unpre-
dictable, and their effects on the econ-
omy are not known with precision.
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fluences business conditions with a
considerable lag of six to 12 months,
accurate forecasts of at least six months
into the future are required for today's
policy actions to have the desired effect
six months from now. That is, in order
to respond to economic conditions
today, we should have foreseen perfect-
ly as far back as last October the cur-
rent state of the economy. With that in-
formation, we would have had to make
the appropriate policy decisions.
The second reason that the Federal Re-
serve cannot fine-tune the economy is
that the only variable the Fed can con-
trol over long periods of time is the price
level. It is clear from both economic
theory and practice that attempting to
stimulate the economy through an easy
monetary policy results only in higher
inflation. An unstable price level leads to
greater uncertainty for households and
businesses, which reduces productivity
and economic well-being. By anchoring
the price level, the Federal Reserve main-
tains the value of our currency and pro-
motes long-term economic efficiency.
Third, switching back and forth from a
recession policy to an inflationary pol-
icy creates its own uncertainty in the
economy about the Federal Reserve's
willingness to control inflation. More-
over, high and variable rates of infla-
tion generally cause mistakes in invest-
ment decisions because market signals
become distorted.
• Regional Business Cycles
I have made these first three arguments
for a stable-price policy on numerous
occasions, and I believe that they alone
are sufficient grounds for the Fed to pur-
sue such a policy exclusively. Yet, there
is another dimension to the national
economy that I believe makes my argu-
ments even more convincing—its
regional diversity.
When addressing the issue of whether
the Fed should respond to business
cycles, one must ask which business
cycle. Policymakers typically think of
the U.S. economy as monolithic and
make policy decisions accordingly.
When monitoring the pulse of the United
States, they examine gross national prod-
uct, the national unemployment rate, and
the national Consumer Price Index. But,
as the past few economic downturns have
dramatically demonstrated, regional econ-
omies behave differently. Instead of each
region marching in step with the national
economy, it appears that some states enter
and leave national recessions at different
times and that some states can even re-
main untouched by national downturns.
So far in this episode, for example, no
more than 16 states have experienced
year-over-year employment loss.
State business cycles exhibited dispa-
rate patterns even during the twin reces-
sions between 1980 and 1982—the most
severe since the Great Depression.
Although the national economy entered
a recessionary period in 1980, Louisi-
ana, Oklahoma, and Texas—all energy-
producing states—exhibited no signifi-
cant slowdown. Their economies also
held up during the much deeper reces-
sion that began in late 1981. However,
as the rest of the country began to climb
out of the second recession, the oil
states began their own downturn. After
these three states recovered briefly with-
in a year of the national trough, they
again slid into a period of employment
decline, lasting well into 1987.
The distinction among regional busi-
ness cycles has been accentuated in
recent years to the extent that some
analysts have even coined the term
"rolling recessions." During the 1980s,
farm states, energy states, and then
Midwest manufacturing states experi-
enced downturns while the nation as a
whole was expanding. Currently, sev-
eral New England states are having
severe problems. For example, after a
period of unprecedented growth during
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
Massachusetts economy plummeted in
June 1986. Rhode Island and New
Hampshire immediately followed suit,
and Vermont and Maine were pulled
into the regional downturn soon there-
after. These states have yet to recover.
• Why the Differences in
Regional Economic Performance?
What, then, explains the variation in
regional business cycles? James Tobin,
the Nobel Laureate macroeconomist,
and William Nordhaus once stated that
the veil of macroeconomic aggregates
conceals "... all the drama of the events
—the rise and fall of products, technol-
ogies, and industries, and the accom-
panying transformation of the spatial
and occupational distribution of the
population." Each regional economy
plays out its own drama against the
backdrop of its natural resources, in-
dustrial structure, human capital, and
physical and cultural infrastructure.
Fluctuations in the national economy are
caused by a combination of structural
shifts and cyclical patterns within each
regional economy. These structural shifts
affect industries and regions differently,
depending on the industry's productivity
and the region's comparative advantage.
For example, because of factors such as
relatively high wages, entrenched special-
interest groups, aging private and public
capital stock, and foreign competition,
manufacturing employment and popula-
tion in many midwestem states have
declined relative to states in the South and
Southwest, as well as to other countries.
Whether these regional shocks are suffi-
ciently large to spill over into other
regions and eventually generate a down-
turn large enough to affect the national
aggregates or averages depends on the
extent of the regional adjustments and the
linkages among regional economies. For
instance, of the nine recessions recorded
since World War II, the Great Lakes
states have ushered in three. This current
downturn marks the first time that the
New England region has led the way.
Regional business cycles are also caused
by broader but more temporary factors.
These broader shocks often hit regions
simultaneously, such as when oil prices
rise suddenly. As a result of differences
in industrial composition and relative
industrial productivity, regions may be
affected differently by an oil price
shock, but the simultaneous impact may
be enough to affect the aggregateeconomy. This may explain why there
is strong evidence that all but one of the
previous eight national recessions have
been preceded by an oil price shock.
Monetary surprises are another example
of shocks that hit regions simultaneously
and have widespread but differing ef-
fects. In the early 1980s, we had two
recessions caused by the monetary pol-
icy mistakes of excessive money growth
during the 1970s. The shock produced
by a disinflationary policy that was
necessary to get our economy back on
an acceptable real growth trend left 46
of the 48 contiguous states with year-
over-year employment losses at some
point during the twin recessions.
• Federal Reserve Policy
within a Regional Context
It is clear, then, that the national economy
is an amalgam of regional economies,
each coping with different structural
shifts. Should the Federal Reserve use a
short-term money-based solution to try to
correct long-term structural shocks facing
perhaps only a handful of regions? The
answer is clearly no for three reasons.
First, the Fed does not have policy instru-
ments that can target one region different-
ly from another region. Second, the
regional economies within this country
already have market mechanisms that can
accommodate adjustments to regional
shocks, and money and capital markets
are national. Third, monetary policy mis-
takes can distort the price signals neces-
sary for these regional market-adjustment
mechanisms to work efficiently.
The Federal Reserve System is unusual
among central banks in that it has the in-
stitutional structure to take a regional
view of the national economy. Each of
the 12 District Bank presidents partic-
ipates in the eight Federal Open Market
Committee meetings held every year.
The meeting agenda includes an oppor-
tunity for each president to share with
the entire Committee current economic
conditions within his District. The Fed-
eral Reserve System also compiles and
releases a synopsis of District condi-
tions, prepared by each of the 12
regional Banks, in what is popularly
called the "Beige Book." However, after
these regional presentations are made,
the FOMC forms a consensus view of
the national economy and conducts
monetary policy according to this view.
In its early days, when the discount
window was the Fed's principal policy
instrument, each Federal Reserve Bank
could (and to some extent did) pursue
its own separate monetary policy by
charging member banks different dis-
count rates, depending on the state of
their regional commerce. Today, how-
ever, regional, national, and internation-
al integration of money and capital mar-
kets precludes this possibility. Although
regional economies maintain distinct
identities, the money that flows through
and circulates within them does not.
Consequently, monetary policy has no
way of responding to the economic
conditions of one region without affect-
ing all regions.
Even if monetary policy could be tar-
geted to individual regions, this would
not necessarily be the most efficient
way to combat structural shocks. The
economy already has mechanisms—
market mechanisms—that can accom-
modate adjustments to these regional
shocks. Although the country is a patch-
work of different regional economies,
these economies are linked by a market
system through which people, capital,
ideas, and technology move back and
forth. The ease with which resources
respond to regional market incentives
enhances the capability of the U.S.
economy to absorb regional shocks.
The United States is unique among in-
dustrial countries in that its regional
economies are unified under one com-
mon currency. Other economies of
similar size, such as those encompassed
by the European Community and the
emerging Pacific Rim countries, are seg-
mented into nations with separate mon-
etary and fiscal institutions and typical-
ly disparate monetary policy goals.
Furthermore, with these national boun-
daries delineating regional economies,
goods and resources generally flow less
freely across those economies than
within ours. For these countries, adjust-
ments to "regional" shocks occur to a
large extent through exchange rates.
Labor and capital flows are the primary
mechanisms by which regional econo-
mies in the United States adjust. A
phrase once used by Chairman Green-
span—"migration arbitrage"—captures
the essence of this regional adjustment
process: resources flowing to the region
in which they receive their greatest
return. The regional flow of workers is
one of several factors that allows for
our economy's relatively quick adjust-
ment to shocks. For example, because
of the easy flow of labor among regions
in this country compared to labor flows
within Europe, one study shows that re-
gional unemployment rates adjust to one
another 20 percent faster in the United
States than in the European Commu-
nity. Even within a single country—
Germany, for instance—it has been esti-
mated that labor migration plays a sur-
prisingly minor role in labor-market
adjustment compared to the United
States. In a similar fashion, capital
flows are also instrumental in the adjust-
ment process. In fact, one of the princi-
pal objectives of the European Commu-
nity's single market policy is to promote
economic growth through a greater reli-
ance on market adjustment mechanisms.
In addition to market mechanisms, the
United States has institutions that en-
hance the regional adjustment process.
The government system of fiscal fed-
eralism essentially provides regional
insurance, in that the combination of
federal tax payments and transfers is
countercyclical, attenuating the impact
of regional shocks on interregional in-
come differentials. The Federal Reserve
System, through its function as lender of
last resort, also acts as an interregional
conduit of funds. The liquidity needed
to prevent widespread failure of solvent
financial institutions in a specific region
is transferred from other parts of the
country by the Fed.
Finally, with well-greased market adjust-
ment mechanisms and institutions al-
ready in place to promote the regional
adjustment process, I believe that there
is no place in this framework for amonetary policy that responds principally
to business cycles. Why should we look
to short-term policy as a way to alleviate
these typically longer-term regional
shocks, many of which are structural? We
cannot forecast with enough precision; the
economy responds to policy with a lag;
and a stimulative monetary policy cannot
alleviate structural problems. By acting as
if the implementation of monetary policy
can overcome these problems, at best we
risk making policy mistakes that would
distort price signals that are essential for
these regional markets to adjust to eco-
nomic disturbances. In addition, since
regional economies are typically at dif-
ferent phases of their own business cycles,
a monetary response to any one regional
shock, even if it is manifested in a
national business cycle, may only inten-
sify the business cycles of other regions.
• Conclusion
A thoughtful consideration of the
nation's regional economic structure
strengthens my belief that the Federal
Reserve should focus solely on long-
term price stability. By viewing the na-
tional economy as a conglomerate of
regional economies, it is easy to see the
futility and potential harm that could
result by acting as if fine-tuning the
money supply could remedy the differ-
ent structural shocks that afflict regional
economies. It is equally apparent that
such monetary policy mistakes could
send shocks through all regions, which
could exacerbate regional business
cycles and make it difficult for regions
to absorb these disturbances.
The only policy that the Federal Reserve
should pursue is price stability. Price sta-
bility maximizes the efficiency of money
as a vehicle of trade across regions, na-
tions, and time. It also eliminates the
necessity to hedge against unanticipated
inflation, thereby channeling resources
to their most productive uses, which is
vitally important for the prudent use of
valuable resources. Price stability encour-
ages long-term investment, which seems
most important for technological ad-
vancement, and enables people to allo-
cate labor and capital across regions in-
telligently—all factors that contribute to
the real growth of a region.
Economic diversity has served our na-
tion well, both as a source of growth and
as a buffer against shocks. Monetary
policy should respect this diversity by
not encumbering the markets through
which resources move. A monetary pol-
icy that promotes price stability is the
best way to ensure long-term national
and regional economic growth.
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